An event study methodology is employed to examine the size and predictability of stock price movements subsequent to the occurrence of a limit order imbalance. Whilst existing studies have examined the association between price pressure and stock prices, there has been no research that has directly examined whether information regarding outstanding limit order imbalances at the end of the trading day can be used to predict subsequent stock price movements. The results indicate that a statistically significant mean positive (negative) abnormal return of 0.63 percent (0.64 percent) is experienced on the day subsequent to a buyside (sell-side) order imbalance. Also statistically significant is the finding that 60.00 percent of abnormal returns for firms experiencing buy-side imbalances are positive and 62.15 percent of abnormal returns for firms experiencing sell-side imbalances are negative, suggesting some degree of predictability. It should be noted however, that whilst the size of the abnormal returns and the ratio of positive-to-negative abnormal returns are statistically significant, they are possibly not economically significant in terms of implementing a profitable trading strategy.
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the predictability of stock price movements from observations of outstanding limit orders. According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), security prices at any given time will reflect all available information and are therefore the best estimate of the intrinsic value of a security. Thus, on an ex-ante basis, no investor should be able to consistently outperform the market as no one has any information that is not already available to everyone else. However, there are numerous studies that document price reactions to analyst reports, broker reports, and 'tip sheets', 1 some of which have concluded that it would be wise for investors to follow the advice of analysts. 2 The EMH suggests that this should only be the case where the recommendation provides investors with some new information, however Barber & Loeffler (1993) find support for the conjecture that the abnormal returns surrounding an analysts' recommendation are a result of both the information content of the recommendation and naïve price pressure. Although informationbacked and naïve price pressure are presented as reasons for the abnormal return observed in Barber and Loeffler (1993) , the general implications of buying and selling pressure on stock prices has received relatively little attention in academic research.
Hopman (2002) presents one of the few papers specifically examining price pressure and stock returns and shows that stock returns are better explained by an examination of supply and demand imbalances than information. Hopman's (2002) definition and measure of supply and demand imbalance differs from that used by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 1 See Hirst, Koonce and Simko (1995) , Stickel (1995) , and Barber and Loeffler (1993) . 2 See Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) , and Barber and Loeffler (1993) .
(2002) and others 3 , in that both realised transactions and outstanding limit orders are incorporated. 4 Hopman also demonstrates that information, either public or private, does not explain this correlation between order flow and price changes. This raises the following questions.
• Is it possible to predict stock price movements using information on limit order imbalances?
• Why might order imbalances occur in the absence of new information?
The primary focus of this study is the first question. Accordingly, this study examines whether it is possible to predict stock price movements using publicly available information on limit order imbalances.
The motivation for this study stems from the desire to better understand the pricing of assets in real markets. Price pressure and order imbalances have generally been ignored in research regarding asset pricing, however, recent evidence suggests that order imbalances do have explanatory power when it comes to stock returns. 5 These studies, however, are few in number; they have generally focussed only on realised transactions; 6 and, they have often looked only at order imbalances surrounding specific events. 7 This study looks at the general (as opposed to event-specific) implications of unrealised limit order imbalances. pressure 8 and the role of order imbalance in explaining stock returns, 9 there has not been any study which specifically looks at whether information regarding limit order imbalances can be used to generate profitable trading strategies.
10
Our results show that statistically significant positive (negative) abnormal returns of 0.82% (0.90%) are experienced over the two days subsequent to a bid-side (ask-size) limit order imbalance, and the relationship between the size of this abnormal return and the size of the firm is negative. An additional analysis was performed testing whether the size of any abnormal return was dependent upon the size of the associated limit order imbalance, however, similar to at least one prior study, there does not appear to be any relationship in this regard.
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relating to order imbalances and their association with stock prices, and behavioural reasons why order imbalances may occur. The data and methodology are discussed in Section 3 and the results and conclustions are presented in Section 4.
8 See Barber and Loeffler (1993) . 9 See Hopman (2002) , and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) . 10 Although the Barber and Loeffler (1993) paper suggests that a profitable trading strategy could be applied by purchasing stocks mentioned in the WSJ "Dartboard" column, the paper only looks at one instance where price pressure is observed.
PRIOR RESEARCH Price Pressure and Stock Returns
The relationship between price pressure and stock returns has rarely been considered in the financial literature; however, one study that examines the impact of excess demand on stock prices is that by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) . Their study examines whether institutional investors destabilise stock prices. To do this, they divide their sample into six portfolios: firstly, two broad categories are created on the basis of whether the stock was net bought or net sold by institutional investors during a month; secondly, these categories are divided into three, depending on the size of the imbalance between net purchases and net sales. The results show a statistically significant size-adjusted excess return of 1.8 percent per quarter for firms that are net bought by institutional investors. However, the relationship is not as expected when looking at the abnormal returns earned by individual portfolios based upon the size of the imbalance: the excess returns do not constantly increase with the size of the imbalance. For firms that are net sold by institutions, the abnormal return across all three portfolios is negative 0.30 percent per quarter and once again, this does not appear to increase with the size of the imbalance.
Each of the six portfolios are then disaggregated further into five size quintiles creating 30 portfolios, and size-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated for each of these. In cases of excess buying, the abnormal return earned on the smallest stocks is not significantly different from zero in either a statistical or an economic sense, however, in cases of excess selling, there is a statistically and economically significant negative return. The relationship is such that the largest negative abnormal return occurs with the largest excess selling. For the second and third smallest portfolios of stocks, excess buying is associated with a significant positive return, however it is interesting that the largest abnormal return is experienced where there is only a 'medium excess' of buy trades as opposed to a 'large excess', as would be expected. Results for excess selling in these two portfolios are as expected; the largest negative returns are experienced where the excess is largest. The relationships tend to disappear in the two largest portfolios.
These results, whilst vaguely suggesting that institutional investors have the potential to destabilize stock prices (especially in smaller stocks), should be interpreted with caution. As the dataset used contains only quarterly changes in institutional holdings, any causal relationship between the imbalance and abnormal return is not able to be determined: do institutional investors destabilise stock prices, or do they engage in positive-feedback trading strategies? Barber and Loeffler (1993) analyse the effect of analysts' recommendations published in the monthly "Dartboard" column of the Wall Street Journal over a 51-day period and find twoday average positive abnormal returns of 4% and that average trading volume on the day of publication of the recommendation is double the average volume levels.
In order to test the 'price pressure' and 'information' hypotheses, they partition their sample according to whether or not the firm experienced positive abnormal trading volume subsequent to the publication of the recommendation. The price pressure hypothesis suggests that a "recommendation creates temporary buying pressure by naïve investors in the recommended security and this buying pressure causes the observed abnormal returns" (Barber and Loeffler [1993] , p. 274). The information hypothesis suggests that the analyst recommendation reveals some relevant information and, thus, the resultant abnormal performance on the announcement represents a fundamental revaluation of the security. It was found that firms experiencing positive abnormal trading volume have a much larger twoday abnormal return; however, this is subsequently partially reversed. Firms that did not experience any abnormal trading volume had a notably smaller, but still positive, two-day abnormal return, with only a negligible subsequent reversal. This led the authors to suggest that the positive abnormal return on the day subsequent to the recommendation is a result of both naïve buying pressure and the information content of the analysts' recommendation.
Although trade imbalances are briefly looked at in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) , and buying pressure is referred to in Barber and Loeffler (1993) as a reason for the abnormal return surrounding a recommendation on the "Dartboard" column, the impact of buying and selling pressure on stock prices (here after referred to as 'price pressure') has remained relatively unexplored. This may be a result of the commonly cited argument that when looking at realised transactions, there are no order imbalances.
In order to get around this problem, some studies have looked at the effect of net order flow, differentiating between identified buyer and seller initiated trades. Kempf and Korn (1999) is one such study that uses this method to examine the extent to which net demand (supply) leads to price increases (decreases) using data on German Stock Index futures. They find that the relationship between net order flow and price change strictly increases with net demand, strictly decreases with net supply, and is not significantly asymmetric. Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) investigate both temporary and permanent price effects of block trades on stock prices, once again differentiating between buyer and seller initiated trades. Their results suggest that price effects are mainly temporary for sellerinitiated transactions and permanent for buyer-initiated transactions. Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) also study the effects of large-block trades, focusing on the size and speed of any adjustment to a new equilibrium. They find that the speed of the adjustment is extremely quick, with most of the adjustment occurring within the first trade.
Hopman (2002) sheds additional light on the relationship between stock return and supply and demand imbalance and develops a new measure of limit order imbalance incorporating market orders, spread orders and limit book orders. 11 This measure of order imbalance differs from previous measures used as it incorporates both realised and unrealised transactions. It is found that order imbalance is strongly correlated with stock movements with an R 2 of around 50% for the average stock, and these stock movements are not subsequently reversed. This is a substantial improvement over the R 2 obtained by Roll (1988) whose results suggest that news cannot explain more than 30% of the price changes (as opposed to 100% as one would first expect). Hopman interprets this as suggesting that mechanical price pressure (through supply and demand imbalances) explains price changes better than information. In order to confirm this interpretation, Hopman shows that the correlation between order flow and return is not driven by either public or private information. Kyle (1985) develops a model to examine the way in which private information affects prices and orders. This model identifies three types of traders: an insider who has access to private information; an uninformed noise trader; and a market maker who sets prices efficiently conditional on the quantities traded by others. Trading is modelled as a sequence of auctions, with two steps. In the first step, the insider and the noise trader choose the quantities they wish to trade. 12 The second step involves the market maker setting a price and trading the 11 Market orders are those that are executed immediately, spread orders are those that are submitted between the lowest ask and the highest bid price (therefore changing either the bid or the ask price), and book orders are those that are submitted inside the order book. Hopman discards the orders that are too far from the best quotes as he finds that their impact is negligible. 12 The insider will choose the quantity they wish to trade with regards to their private information regarding the liquidation value of the asset as well as the past prices and quantities they have traded. They do not observe the quantity that makes the market clear. The market maker's information consists of the current and past aggregate quantities traded by the insider and the noise traders combined, which is defined as the order flow. As the market maker does not know the disaggregate amounts traded by either trader, and does not have any other kind of special information, price fluctuations are always a consequence of order-flow innovations. In the context of this model, prices will move with supply and demand imbalance because a change in demand, and hence order flow imbalance, may reveal some private information.
Price Pressure and Behavioural Biases
Shiller ( "Solomon Asch (1952) reported a (now famous) experiment that has been widely interpreted as demonstrating the power of social pressure, but that might better be regarded as an experiment demonstrating that people rationally take into account the information revealed by others' actions. In each of these experiments, Asch placed a subject in a group of people, the other members of which were confederates. The group was asked to answer a sequence of 12 questions about the lengths of line segments; and answers to all questions were obvious and were nearly always correctly answered when presented to individual respondents outside of a group. In each experiment the confederates were told to give an incorrect answer on seven of current or future prices or quantities traded by noise traders. The noise trader chooses the quantity they which to trade as a random selection from a known distribution.
the 12 questions. The subjects, reacting to the conflict between their own senses and the unanimous consensus of the rest of the group, showed evidence of anxiety and distress, and in a third of their responses then made the same error as the majority." Shiller (1995, p. 181) Subsequent to both the papers by Asch (1952) and West (1988) , a series of papers have appeared which attempt to model the behaviour of investors. Specifically, the papers presented here attempt to explain and demonstrate how and why investors may place naïve orders, thus creating naïve price pressure.
Topol (1991) presents a model for the behaviour of sellers and buyers who know they have imperfect and incomplete information. This model takes into account both this imperfect information, and the influence of the "collective point of view." In this model, bid and ask prices characterise the agents. "To set his bid and/or ask price each agent, knowing his own information set is incomplete, cannot totally rely on the present value calculation which is not the fundamental value in the sense of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. To gain some more information, it is rational… for the investor to adjust his prices relative to some other agents' prices which may contain some information not available to him. By such behaviour, he implicitly extends his own information set. The bid and/or ask price dynamics is then formalised as an additive learning process between present value and mimetic contagion 13 which represents relations between agents" (p. 787). This model can be used to explain both the 'contagion' bubble as well as the 'contagion' volatility of the stock price.
Banerjee ( This requires a formalism that describes the formation of expectations by those traders who are not fully informed of the fundamentals of the stock. These expectations are based mainly on the behaviour and expectations of others, implying a mimetic contagion 14 amongst speculators. However, he also suggests that the willingness of speculators' to act in this herdlike manner will depend on whether the market is in a bullish or bearish state, and thus incorporates these attributes of the market into his model. Shiller (1995) responds to stories on informational cascade by suggesting that whilst important, their first-mover/sequential aspect may not be widely applicable. He then 14 As described by Topol (1991) .
discusses some examples of the role that 'reputation' 15 and 'saving-face' play in communication, leading him to suggest that differences in the herd-like behaviour across different groups may be due in part to this, as opposed to merely informational herding. Avery and Zemsky (1998) shown that if the rumour persists and it has an effect on individual preferences, then the longrun prices will differ from the fundamental value. Conversely, if the rumour disappears, longrun prices will correspond to the fundamental values.
In addition to the psychological/behavioural evidence and the models presented above, there have been a number of empirical studies examining this herding phenomenon. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) evaluate herding in pension fund trading. When there is a large imbalance between the number of funds buying and selling a given stock, then this is considered evidence of herding. Their results indicate that pension fund managers show no 15 Although not discussed in here, reputation-based herding revolves around the principle that conforming with others will make it difficult to ascertain the true quality or ability of something. For example, consider a share analyst who places a strong-buy recommendation on a stock, whilst others around them are placing sell recommendations. Where the stock subsequently performs well, the share analyst will be highly regarded. However, should the stock subsequently perform poorly, the share analyst's reputation will be severely tarnished. If the manager conforms with the recommendation of others, then their ability will be hidden behind these and in cases where they make incorrect recommendations, the can retort and say "well, so did everyone else." 16 I.e. where there is uncertainty surrounding both the fundamental value of the stock, and the information held by other investors. 17 Kosfeld focuses on rumours as an information transmission procedure between agents that act in a two-good exchange economy, and makes a number of restrictive assumptions on the communication and evolution of the rumour.
evidence of substantial herding, except for in small stocks and they explain this small firm anomaly in terms of the public information that is available for these small stocks. 18 Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) also examine the herd-like behaviour of mutual funds using the Lakonishok et al. measure of herding. They examine the both the extent to which these funds herd, and the extent to which herding and momentum affect the performance of these funds. They find statistically significant evidence which suggests that mutual funds tend to implement momentum strategies (buy past winners) and to herd, however, the evidence regarding herding is probably not economically significant.
Wermers (1999) also analyses whether or not mutual funds herd whilst they trade stock, and the impact of this on stock prices. Although finding very little evidence of herding on average, they do document a much higher incidence of herding in small stocks, especially on the sell side.
Although not evidence of herding, many other studies have shown the propensity for investors to act according to available information, not necessarily fundamental information. Sawicki (2000) finds strong evidence of a positive relationship between the flow of money into a fund, and its past performance despite there being very little empirical support for any positive relationship between the past and future performance of funds. This supports Kritzman's (1983) suggestion that past performance is "perhaps the most commonly used criterion to determine manager selection," possibly because it is easily obtainable, quantitative, and intuitively appealing.
Research Questions
This research aims to contribute to the literature by directly examining the relationship between limit order imbalances and subsequent price movements utilising a unique set of Australian market data. The main questions addressed are:
• Does a limit order imbalance generate price pressure?
• Is this price pressure temporary or permanent?
• Does firm size play a role in determining the magnitude of price pressure?
This section describes the order imbalance data, variable specification, and methods used in answer the research questions. It also briefly discusses the parametric and non-parametric tests conducted to determine the significance of the results.
Data and Sample Selection
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) allows limit orders to be placed, allowing for a study the effects of any imbalance between outstanding buy and sell orders. This study uses data on Finance (CRIF) database. As this study tests both whether there is a price reaction associated with order imbalances, and if order imbalance information can be used to implement trading strategies, this data is ideal as it is readily available to the public.
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This study examines the outstanding orders at the end of the trading day, a decision that achieves two objectives. Firstly, the use of end-of-day data means that investors have greater time to identify shares where there is an order imbalance than if another point during the trading day were used. Secondly, taking the data from a particular point in time (as opposed every point during the trading day where an order imbalance occurs) reduces the likelihood that these order imbalances are caused purely by the release of new information.
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Keeping this in mind, "quantity demanded" is defined as the total quantity bid for at the two highest bid prices at the end of the day and similarly, "quantity offered" is the total quantity offered at the two lowest ask prices at the end of the day. The bid and ask quantities at only these two levels are used in order to minimise problems that may arise as a result of large price differences between the highest and fifth highest bid prices, and similarly, between the lowest and fifth lowest ask prices. In a similar fashion, Hopman (2002) discards orders that are too far from the best quotes as he finds that their impact is negligible.
The measure of "order imbalance" used for this study is based on inequality between the quantity demanded and the quantity offered. This is similar in principle to that used by studies investigating the herding behaviour and stock price effects of mutual funds (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1991] , Wermers [1999] ). An arbitrary decision was made on a ratio of ten-to-one to signal an imbalance. Where the quantity demanded is ten times the quantity being offered, there is buying pressure; where the quantity offered is ten times the quantity demanded, there is selling pressure. This ratio was chosen for the following reason:
an imbalance much smaller than this may introduce an unnecessary amount of noise due to the identification of imbalances which are merely functions of regular day-to-day trading activity; an imbalance much larger from this may result in too few observations. The occurrence of either buying or selling pressure constitutes an 'event', and the date of this 20 According to the semi-strong-form EMH, the impact of news on orders should dissipate quickly, and unless all news is released at the end of the trading day, order imbalances at the end of the trading day should not be purely a result of new information released to the market.
occurrence is labelled the 'event date' (t = 0), 21 however, to be included in the sample, each event must satisfy several additional criteria.
Firstly, the stock must have traded on a daily basis for each of the 20 trading-days prior to the event date. This is done in order to minimise the occurrence of days where no trade occurred during the testing (post-event date) period, however, in instances where a stock does not trade on a particular day during the post-event period, the market return has been substituted in.
This requirement also serves to exclude many thinly traded stocks that may trade only on days where there is significant news released either by, or about, the company. Secondly, an event is only included in the sample if no other event has been recorded by the same stock in the prior 51 trading days. This helps ensure independence between the events for a particular stock. A third restriction requires the aggregate dollar value of shares demanded and offered at these two highest bid and two lowest ask levels to be at least $10,000. This requirement also serves to exclude many thinly trades stocks, as well as reducing the number of potentially noisy transactions involving only a 'few' shares. Finally, filters were imposed ensuring that there were at least 50 returns during the estimation period for each stock, and a maximum of 10 returns were permitted to be missing during the event period. These criteria and filters resulted in a sample of 11,469 events. Table 1 provides details regarding the number of events that satisfied the criteria and filters. 
Methodology
An event study methodology using the market-adjusted returns model and daily share prices was employed to calculate the abnormal returns associated with an order imbalance. As previously mentioned, each event date is labelled as t = 0 and all other trading days before and after the event date are labelled accordingly. An event period spanning 51 days around the event date was specified (t = -20 to t = +30) while the 255 days prior to the event period (t = -275 to t = -21) was specified as the estimation period.
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The market-adjusted returns model was used to estimate the abnormal returns for each of the 51 days in the event period.
23 On a stock-by-stock basis, the market-adjusted abnormal returns were calculated by subtracting the return on the market portfolio for the day from the return on the individual stock, where the value-weighted All Ordinaries Accumulation Index was used to proxy for the market portfolio. Any returns not accounted for by the market adjustment are captured by the residual term, u i,t and it is this residual term that is classified as the abnormal return (AR) for stock i on day t, (AR it ). This can be expressed as follows.
is the residual/AR for stock i on day t,
is the log price relative of stock i on day t; and t m R , is the log price relative of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index for time t.
As this study examines whether order imbalances are associated with specific or predictable types of return behaviour across all stocks, cross-sectional averages of the abnormal returns are of interest, not only those of individual stocks. Therefore, the mean abnormal return for day t (AR t ) across all stocks is calculated. This can be expressed as:
where t i u , is the estimated residual for security i for day t and N t is the number of events for which return data is available on day t.
this model is greatest when using daily data. Despite this, all tests were also run using OLS market-model returns and the results obtained were very similar. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of our study indicate that statistically significant positive abnormal returns are associated with bid-side limit order imbalances, and, statistically significant negative abnormal returns are associated with sell-side limit order imbalances. Also, 60.00 percent (62.15 percent) of abnormal returns for firms that experience bid-side (sell-side) imbalances are positive (negative), suggesting some degree of predictability. These results are robust to the use of market-models returns, market adjusted returns, raw returns, and market adjusted holding period returns. Table 2 presents the daily abnormal returns surrounding the date of the order imbalance and Figures 1 and 2 depict the cumulative abnormal returns from day t = +1 and day t = -20, until day t = +30, respectively. Table 2 indicates that abnormal returns were experienced in the expected direction for two days subsequent to a limit order imbalance.
Limit Bid Order and Limit Ask Order Imbalances
24 This is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level using both Patell Z test and the generalised sign test. The lack of any systematic pattern with regards to the significant abnormal returns on days apart from day t = +1 and t = +2, and the lack of any other statistically significant abnormal returns at the 0.1 percent level suggests that the abnormal return experienced on these days are associated with the order imbalance event and are not merely a random occurrence. The finding that buy-side pressure (sell-side pressure), in terms of a limit order imbalances, is associated with a statistically significant positive (negative) abnormal return of 0.63 percent (0.64 percent) on the day subsequent to the imbalance is consistent with the model presented by Kyle (1985) which demonstrates that price fluctuations will be a consequence of supply and demand imbalance (order-flow imbalance). Whilst it is not within the scope of this study to examine the reasons for these order imbalances, this result is also consistent with the empirical study by Barber and Loeffler (1993) who find that the abnormal return on the day subsequent to a recommendation in the Wall Street Journal is a result of both naïve price pressure, and information.
25 Table 2 suggests that 60.00 percent of the abnormal returns on the day subsequent to a buyside order imbalance are positive, and 62.15 percent of the abnormal returns on the day subsequent to a sell-side order imbalance are negative. The ratios of positive-to-negative abnormal returns are statistically different from the 'prior' ratios as determined during the estimation period suggesting some degree of predictability. It should be noted however that whilst the size of the abnormal returns and the ratio of positive-to-negative returns are statistically significant, they are possibly not economically significant in terms of implementing a trading strategy. Figure 2 shows a statistically significant positive abnormal return of 1.80 percent prior to the sell-side order imbalance, suggestive of investors 'cashing in' after a period of abnormal gains. Once again, it is beyond the scope of this study to determine the cause of the order imbalance, however unless all investors simultaneously decide to take their profits, it is possible that this selling-pressure is a result of herd-like behaviour. This could manifest itself in the following way: investors, seeing other investors placing sell orders, may believe that private information is contained within these orders and may copy their actions in order to take advantage of this. This would create an excess of orders on one side of the limit order book, thus creating an imbalance. Whilst it is possible that this ask-side imbalance is a result of some release of new information, this does not explain abnormal returns in the lead up to the date of the order imbalance. The CAR over the 20-day period prior to the bid-side order imbalance is not statistically different from zero, thus it is difficult to apply a similar story to that applied to the ask-side imbalances. In this instance, and similar to the scenario presented by Barber and Loeffler (1993) , the order imbalance may have been either as a result of naïve buying pressure, or information.
Results from this section also indicate the cumulative abnormal return from day t = +3 to t = +5 for firms experiencing bid-side (ask-side) pressure is 0.09 percent (-0.24 percent) which is neither statistically (at the 1 percent level) or economically significant. This indicates that the majority of the price movement associated with an order imbalance occurs within a day (or two) of the event.
In summary, the results from this section indicate that firms experiencing a high ratio of bidorders to ask-orders experience a statistically significant return of 0.63 percent in the day subsequent to the order imbalance, and firms experiencing a high ratio of ask-orders to bid-orders experience a statistically significant return of negative 0.64 percent in the day subsequent to the order imbalance. Over the first two days subsequent to the order imbalance, the cumulative abnormal returns are 0.82 percent and -0.90 percent, respectively. The first hypothesis can be rejected based on the statistically significant finding that on the day subsequent to the event date, 60.00 percent (62.15 percent) of firms experiencing ask-side (bid-side) pressure experience positive (negative) abnormal returns, although these may not be construed as economically significant. Also, the behaviour of the returns for the 30 days subsequent to the event is different with regards to bid-side and ask-side pressure although some explanation may be provided for this by looking at the abnormal returns experienced prior to the order imbalance event.
Size Effects
The samples of 'bid' and 'ask' imbalances are partitioned into three equally sized portfolios based on market capitalisation of the firm on the day of the order imbalance. These firms are referred to as 'bid 1', 'bid 2', 'bid 3', 'ask 1', 'ask 2', and 'ask 3' in Figure 3 , with '1' being indicative of the third of firms with the largest market capitalisation, '2' representing firms in the middle third according to market capitalisation, and '3' signifying the third of firms with the smallest market capitalisation. Table 3 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for small, medium and large sized firms experiencing 'bid' or 'ask' limit order imbalances.
The results both here and in Figure 3 indicate that the abnormal returns are stronger for small market capitalisation firms. The smallest firms experience a bid-side order imbalance experience a positive abnormal return of 1.13 percent during the two days subsequent to the order imbalance. This abnormal return decreases to 0.85 percent and 0.49 percent when looking at medium and large sized firms, respectively. Similarly, the smallest firms experiencing an ask-side order imbalance experience a negative abnormal return of 1.43 percent during the two days subsequent to the order imbalance and once again, this decreases to negative 0.79 percent and negative 0.49 percent when looking at medium and large sized firms. These results are all statistically significant. An examination of Figure 3 reveals that the returns experienced by the smallest firms in the period prior to the order imbalance are larger than those experienced by both the middle sized and largest firms. Over the period from day t = -20 to day t = 0, the abnormal returns experienced by portfolios 'bid 3' and 'ask 3' are -1.41 percent and 4.82 percent, respectively.
By comparison, the abnormal returns experienced by the remaining portfolios range between 0.06 percent and 0.52 percent. In addition to this observation, it is also interesting to note the differences in the abnormal returns experienced during the period from day t = +3 to day t = +30 for small firms, compared with the medium and large sized firms. The abnormal returns over this period for the smallest firms are -1.99 percent and -1.72 percent for portfolios 'ask 3' and 'bid 3', respectively, whilst the abnormal returns experienced by the remaining portfolios over this period range between -1.30 percent and 0.45 percent.
One possible interpretation of this is that medium and large sized firms experience limit order imbalances usually as a result of information, whilst small firms experience limit order imbalances both as a result of information and for 'non-information based' reasons. This would explain the insignificant abnormal returns (at the 1 percent level) experienced by the medium and large sized firms prior to the order imbalance, as well as the lack of any economically significant abnormal returns from day t = +3 onwards. If the order imbalances experienced by small firms were purely a result of information, one would expect a similar pattern as above, however, the small firms experience significant (both statistically and economically) abnormal returns prior to the order imbalance, as well as from day t = +3
onwards. This suggests is suggestive of some non-information based reason for the order imbalance. This table displays the cumulative abnormal returns, ratio of positive to negative returns, Patell (1976) Z-statistics, and generalised sign test statistics earned by stocks experiencing either a buy-side or sell-side limit order imbalance. Stocks are divided into three equal-sized portfolios based upon the firms market capitalisation on day 0. '1' represents firms with the largest market capitalisation whilst '3' represents firms with the smallest market capitalisation. '2' represents firms between these two extremes.
Ask 1 Ask 2 Ask 3

Additional Analysis
An additional analysis is performed to test if the size of the order imbalance had a significant relationship with the size of the abnormal return. The reason for conducting this additional analysis stems from inconsistent findings in prior literature. On one hand, Hopman (2002) finds that mechanical pressure through supply and demand imbalances explains price changes better than information, suggesting that the larger the imbalance, the greater the associated price change. However, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) , when examining stocks that are either net bought or net sold by institutional investors, find that the abnormal returns are not constantly increasing with the size of the imbalance.
In order to examine which of these was true in the case of this study, both the samples of 'bid'
and 'ask' imbalances were once again partitioned into three equally sized portfolios, this time based upon the size of the order imbalance. These firms are referred to as 'bid a', 'bid b', 'bid c', 'ask a', 'ask b', and 'ask c' in Table 1 , with 'a' being indicative of the third of firms with the largest order imbalance, 'b' representing firms in the middle third according to the degree of order imbalance, and 'c' signifying the third of firms with the smallest order imbalance. Table 4 and Figure 4 show the cumulative abnormal returns for firms experiencing small, medium and large 'bid' or 'ask' limit order imbalances. Although no statistical tests are performed comparing the abnormal returns for these portfolios on the days t = +1 and t = +2, the results are indicative of there being no substantial difference in abnormal returns based on the size of the imbalance. This result is consistent with the finding by Lakonishok et al. (1991) . Mean CAR surrounding Order Imbalances (from t = +1) based on Size-of-Imbalance portfolios
Discussion and Conclusion
This study examines the abnormal returns associated with an imbalance between the number of outstanding limit-bid and limit-ask orders.
The major findings of this study are:
• a positive cumulative abnormal return of 0.82% was experienced over the two days immediately subsequent to a bid-side limit order imbalance;
• a negative cumulative abnormal return of 0.90% was experienced over the two days immediately subsequent to an ask-side limit order imbalance;
• a negative relationship exists between the level of the abnormal return experienced and the size of the firm; and
• there does not appear to be any significant relationship between the size of the limit order imbalance and the abnormal return. The results confirm that, on average, abnormal returns following an order imbalance are statistically significant, in terms of both size, and predictability and abnormal returns are much more pronounced when looking at firms with small market capitalisations.
These results are consistent with what has been found in prior studies, however this study has taken a different approach from that taken by other studies. This study looked at abnormal returns surrounding all occurrences of limit order imbalances, whereas the study by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) examined returns surrounding imbalances in the actual quantity of trades by pension fund managers in individual stocks; the study by Barber and Loeffler (1993) examined abnormal returns surrounding a broker recommendation in the Wall Street Journal and presented naïve price pressure as a reason for these abnormal returns;
and, the study by Hopman (2002) examined the power of order imbalances in explaining stock price movements.
These findings have implications for both the investment community and academic research.
The results, although possibly not economically significant when looking at all instances of bid-side and ask-side limit order imbalances, highlight that it is possible to predict the direction of returns on subsequent days. This suggests that it could be possible to refine the asset-pricing framework, with reference to limit order imbalances, to more accurately describe the return generating process.
The implications for investors are in terms of a possible trading strategy. Perhaps it would be wise to look towards the actions of others when making trading decisions, particularly after periods of abnormal gains. This is especially the case for small market capitalisation firms.
The most obvious area of future research would be to determine the 'cause' of the order imbalance. Are order imbalances purely a result of information, or are they a result of human behaviour. If, as is likely, order imbalances are caused by several different reasons then it would be of interest to examine whether order imbalances caused by these different reasons were associated with different subsequent returns.
